Playing optimally using memory

Youssouf Oualhadj¹ Based on joint work with:

Patricia Bouyer², Stéphane Le Roux², Mickael Randour³, Pierre Vandenhove^{2,3}

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LACL – Université Paris Est Créteil, Créteil, France
LSV – CNRS & ENS Paris-Saclay, Université Paris-Saclay, Saint-Aubin, France
F.R.S.-FNRS & UMONS – Université de Mons, Mons, Belgium



Two-player games

Example



Setting

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We consider:

- $\bullet\,$ Finite graphs, a set of colors C, and a mapping from edges to colors.
- $\bullet\,$ Two players, Max (circle) and Min (square).
- A preference relation \sqsubseteq (total preorder) over C^ω for Max.
- Inverse relation \sqsubseteq^{-1} for Min.

Controller synthesis

Example

.



 \sqsubseteq : visit 3 at least once

Controller synthesis

Example



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Design *an optimal* strategy for Max w.r.t. the preference relation \sqsubseteq .

Simple controller

Example

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Strategy for Max

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 $3\mapsto 3; 7\mapsto 3; 6\mapsto 7.$

Complex controller



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 \sqsubseteq : infinitely often 2 and infinitely often 0

Complex controller





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Strategy for Max

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 $0 \ 1 \mapsto 2; \ 2 \ 1 \mapsto 0.$

Very complex controller

Example



 \sqsubseteq : infinitely often *b* and limit of the average is ≥ 0

Very complex controller

Example



\sqsubseteq : infinitely often *b* and limit of the average is ≥ 0

Strategy for Max			
$0\mapsto 0;$	$0 \ 0 \mapsto 1;$	$0 \ 0 \ 1 \mapsto 0;$	$0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 0 \mapsto 0;$
$0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 0 \ 0 \mapsto 0;$	$0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \mapsto 0;$	$0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \mapsto 1;$	$0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 1 \mapsto 0;$

Recap

Controller synthesis

Design *an optimal* strategy for Max w.r.t. the preference relation \sqsubseteq .

Simple Controller

Decision making depends on the current state; *memoryless* strategies.

Complex Controller

Decision making depends on a bounded history; *finite memory* strategies.

Very complex Controller

Decision making depends on the full history; *infinite memory* strategies.

Definition

Both players can play *optimally* using *memoryless* strategies w.r.t \sqsubseteq and \sqsubseteq^{-1} .

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 $\operatorname{GZ-Criterion}$

In 2005, Gimbert & Zielonka characterize the preference relations for which memoryless *optimal strategies* exist for both players.

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 $\operatorname{GZ-Criterion}$

In 2005, Gimbert & Zielonka characterize the preference relations for which memoryless *optimal strategies* exist for both players.



Furthermore

Lifting corollary (Gimbert, Zielonka'05)

Let \sqsubseteq be a preference relation, assume that:

- $i. \ {\rm In} \ all \ {\sf Max-} are nas \ {\rm memoryless} \ {\rm optimal \ strategies} \ {\rm exist.}$
- *ii*. In *all* Min-*arenas* memoryless optimal strategies exist (w.r.t. \sqsubseteq^{-1}).

Then, both players have memoryless optimal strategies in all two-player arenas.

Remark

Establishing i. and ii. is usually "easy".

Our hope

Extends all of the above to *finite memory determinacy*.

Definition

 \sqsubseteq is *finite memory determined* if finite memory optimal strategies suffice for both players.

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Example



 $i. \ \mbox{The running sum of weights grows up to infinity or,}$

 $ii.\,$ the running sum of weights takes value zero infinitely often.

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• Max needs *infinite memory* to play optimally.

Definition

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Example



i. The running sum of weights grows up to infinity or,

 $ii.\,$ the running sum of weights takes value zero infinitely often.

- Max needs *infinite memory* to play optimally.
- In both the one-player versions *finite memory* optimal strategies exist.

Arena dependent V.S Arena independent finite memory



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Our contribution

A characterization of the *arena independent* finite memory determined preference relations.

Arena independent finite memory

Memory structure

An automaton-like formalism that given a color and a memory state, updates to the new memory state.

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 $\mathcal{M} ext{-} ext{Selectivity}$

 $\neg c_0$

 c_0

 C_2

.

 $\neg c_2$

2



Results

Theorem (Bouyer, Le Roux, O., Randour, Vandenhove'20)

Let \sqsubseteq be a preference relation and let \mathcal{M} be a memory structure, then both players have optimal arena independent finite memory strategies based on a memory structure \mathcal{M} in all games if and only if \sqsubseteq and \sqsubseteq^{-1} are \mathcal{M} -monotone and \mathcal{M} -selective.

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Corollary

Let \sqsubseteq be a preference relation, assume that:

i. In *all* Max-*arena* arena independent finite memory optimal strategies exist.

ii. In *all* Min-*arenas* arena independent finite memory optimal strategies exist (w.r.t. \sqsubseteq^{-1}).

Then, both players have arena independent finite memory optimal strategies in *all two-player arenas*.

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Then, both players have arena independent finite memory optimal strategies in *all two-player arenas*.

Remark

The memory structure in the two-player case is the product of the memory structure in the one-player case.

From finite memory to $\mathcal M\text{-}\mathrm{monotone}$ and $\mathcal M\text{-}\mathrm{selective}$

Follows the steps of Gimbert & Zielonka's proof.

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Requires the notion of *covered arenas*.

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 $\sqsubseteq:$ 1 and 2 infinitely often.

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Crucial steps

- *i.* If \sqsubseteq is \mathcal{M} -monotone and \mathcal{M} -selective, then for any arena $\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{A} \times \mathcal{M}$ is a *covered* arena.
- *ii*. In *covered* arenas it is possible to play optimally with memoryless strategies.

Conclusion

Results

- Characterization of ${\it AIFM}\mbox{-}determinacy.$
- A lifting corollary in the context of ${\it AIFM}\xspace$ optimal strategies.

Future directions

- Characterization of ${\it ADFM}$ -determinacy.
- More general arenas e.g., *stochastic games*.