

Lecture 1: Introduction to model checking

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Model Checking and Systems Verification

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What are we **interested** in?

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Software Controllers

Code that controls the working of
safety critical systems

Safety-critical systems

Controlled by software

- ▶ Aircrafts
- ▶ Medical devices
- ▶ Cars
- ▶ Nuclear power plants
- ▶ Space missions
- ▶ Railway signalling systems
- ▶ *and many more ...*

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Correctness of these software is very important

Accidents due to software bugs

- ▶ *Igor Walukiewicz's slides (4 - 7)*
- ▶ *Yogananda Jeppu's slides (22 - 38)*

Errors that are hard to detect

Concurrent programs

```
while x < 200
```

```
x := x+1
```

```
while x>0
```

```
x := x-1
```

```
while x=200
```

```
x := 0
```

Concurrent programs

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while x > 0
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while x = 200
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```
  x := 0
```

Is the value of x **always** between 0 and 200?

Concurrent programs

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while x < 200
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x := x+1
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while x > 0
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x := x-1
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while x = 200
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x := 0
```

Is the value of x always between 0 and 200? **No!** (why?)

Goal: Make **low-defect** software controllers

Traditional testing **insufficient** for safety-critical systems

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Traditional testing **insufficient** for safety-critical systems

→ A new **verification technology** called **Model-checking**



Edmund Clarke




Allen Emerson



Joseph Sifakis


Model Checking

Think of controllers as **finite state machines**



Model Checking

Think of controllers as **finite state machines**



Philosophy: Computations as sequences of states - Igor's slides (55 - 57)

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Is the value of x **always** between 0 and 200?

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while x < 200
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


```
x := x+1
```

```
while x > 0
```


```
x := x-1
```


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while x=200
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
```
x := 0
```



Is the value of x always between 0 and 200?








Is the value of x always between 0 and 200? **No**

Instead of writing the code directly, the functionality is **specified as a suitable mathematical model** (extensions of finite state machines)



This **mathematical object** can then be **analyzed**.


The final **code can be generated directly** from the model.




satisfy








Model-checkers




Model-checkers



Model-checkers **automatically** solve the above question

Model-checkers



Model-checkers **automatically** solve the above question

Some model-checkers: NuSMV, SPIN, TLA+, SCADE Suite

Success of Model-checking

Airbus

- ▶ Uses SCADE Suite (developed by Esterel Technologies) to **develop critical on board software** for A340-500/600, A380 series aircrafts
- ▶ **Significant decrease of coding errors** due to extensive use of automatic code generation. For Airbus A340, up to 70% of the code has been automatically generated
- ▶ **Major productivity improvement**, which is particularly significant considering that the size of the software doubles with each new Airbus program

Source: Website of Esterel Technologies

Hardware verification

- ▶ Many companies, including industry leaders such as **AT&T, Cadence, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Intel, LSI Logic, Motorola, Rockwell, Texas Instruments, and Silicon Graphics** have created formal verification groups to help with ongoing designs.
- ▶ In many cases, these groups began by demonstrating the effectiveness of formal verification by **finding subtle design errors** that were overlooked by months of simulation.

Source: Acceptance of formal methods: Lessons from hardware design, by D. Dill and J. Rushby

Amazon

- ▶ Since 2011, engineers at Amazon Web Services (AWS) have used formal specification and model checking to help **solve difficult design problems in critical systems**

Source: How Amazon Web Services Uses Formal Methods, by C. Newcombe et al.

Some other places where **Model Checking** technology is used

- ▶ *Avionics:* Rockwell Collins, Honeywell
- ▶ *Automobiles:* Toyota
- ▶ *Space:* NASA, European Space Agency
- ▶ *Others:* Microsoft Research, Tata
- ▶ *Model-checking solutions:*
Esterel technologies, BTC embedded systems,
Mathworks, Prover technology

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Backed by many **university groups** from all over the world!

Turing Award 2007

Clarke, Emerson and Sifakis for Model-checking

Some other Turing award winners:

- ▶ Edsger Dijkstra (1972)
- ▶ Donald Knuth (1974)
- ▶ Rabin and Scott (1976)
- ▶ Tony Hoare (1980)
- ▶ Ritchie and Thompson (1983)
- ▶ Hopcroft and Tarjan (1986)
- ▶ Rivest, Shamir, Adleman (2002)


Turing Award 1996



Amir Pnueli

Pnueli received the Turing Award for seminal work **introducing temporal logic** into computing science and for outstanding contributions to **program and systems verification**

Turing Award 2013



Leslie Lamport

He devised important algorithms and developed **formal modeling and verification protocols** that improve the quality of **real distributed systems**. These contributions have resulted in **improved correctness, performance, and reliability of computer systems**.

What we have seen?

- ▶ Software control many **safety-critical** systems
- ▶ **Accidents** do occur due to **software errors**
- ▶ Model-checking is an additional **verification method**
- ▶ Model-checking has been **successful**

In this course

Introduction to **techniques, tools and challenges** in
model-checking

- ▶ **Part 1: (Srivathsan)** Basic concepts, Automata-theoretic methods
- ▶ **Part 2: (Srivivas)** Advanced concepts, Symbolic model-checking

Book: Principles of Model Checking,
Christel Baier and Joost-Pieter Katoen, MIT Press (2008)