




The following equations can be shown by induction:

$$v_k(a) = \begin{cases} \max_{a \rightarrow b} (w_{ab} + \gamma_{k-1}(b)) & a \in V_{\max} \\ \min_{a \rightarrow b} (w_{ab} + \gamma_{k-1}(b)) & a \in V_{\min}. \end{cases}$$

This gives an algorithm to compute  $\vec{v}_k$  for each  $k$ .



Claim: Compute  $\vec{v}_k$  for  $k = 4n^3W$ . The value vector for the mean-payoff game can then be deciphered in constant-time.

Lemma 1: For every  $a \in V$ ,

$$k \cdot v(a) - 2nW \leq v_k(a) \leq k \cdot v(a) + 2nW$$

Proof: Consider optimal strategy  $\sigma$  in  $F$  starting from ' $a$ '. Show that playing that strategy  $\sigma$  with stack-based extension  $\tilde{\sigma}$  gives  $v_k(a) \geq k \cdot v(a) - 2nW$

Similarly using  $\tilde{\tau}$  and  $\tilde{\tau}'$  show other inequality.

(8)

In above Lemma, substituting  $k = 4n^3 w$  gives:

$$\frac{v_k(a)}{k} \leq v(a) + \frac{2nw}{k}$$

i.e.,

$$\leq v(a) + \frac{1}{2n^2} \quad \longrightarrow ①$$

$$n^2 \geq n(n-1)$$

$$\therefore \frac{1}{n^2} \leq \frac{n(n-1)}{n(n-1)}$$

$$\therefore -\frac{1}{n^2} \geq -\frac{1}{n(n-1)} \rightarrow ②$$

~~$v'(a) = \frac{v_k(a)}{k}$~~

$$v(a) \geq v'(a)$$

~~$\frac{v_k(a)}{k} \geq v(a) + \frac{1}{2n^2}$~~

$$\text{Let } v'(a) = \frac{v_k(a)}{k}$$

$$① \text{ gives: } v(a) \geq v'(a) - \frac{1}{2n^2}$$

$$② \text{ gives: } v(a) > v'(a) - \frac{1}{2n(n-1)} \quad [\text{strict inequality } \because n > 1] \longrightarrow ③$$

~~$v'(a) \geq v(a) - \frac{2nw}{k}$~~  [ previous Lemma ]

$$v(a) \leq v'(a) + \frac{1}{2n^2}, \quad [k = 4n^3 w]$$

$$\text{From } ②: \quad v(a) < v'(a) + \frac{1}{2n(n-1)} \quad \longrightarrow ④$$

Overall:

$$v'(a) - \frac{1}{2n(n-1)} < v(a) < v'(a) + \frac{1}{2n(n-1)}$$



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From the previous discussion, it follows that if we do the value iteration for  $k = 4n^3 W$  steps, we get a vector  $v'(a)$ : and  $v(a)$  is in the  $\frac{1}{2n(n-1)}$  ball around it.

Observation about value: From the first cycle game, note that the value will be of the form  $\frac{p}{q}$  where  $q \leq n$ , [ $p, q$  are integers].

Claim: Pick 2 no.s.  $\frac{a}{b}$ ,  $\frac{p}{q}$  s.t.  $0 \leq q, b \leq n$ .  
 $a, b, p, q \in \mathbb{Z}$ ,  $n \neq 1$ .

$$\text{Then } \left| \frac{a}{b} - \frac{p}{q} \right| \geq \frac{1}{n(n-1)} \quad \underbrace{\text{distinct}}$$

Proof: Suppose  $b = q$ .

$$\left| \frac{a}{b} - \frac{p}{q} \right| = \left| \frac{a-p}{q} \right| = \frac{|a-p|}{q} \geq \frac{1}{q} \geq \frac{1}{n} \geq \frac{1}{n(n-1)}$$

Suppose  $b \neq q$ .

$$\left| \frac{a}{b} - \frac{1}{q} \right| = \frac{|aq - bp|}{bq} \geq \frac{1}{bq} \geq \frac{1}{n(n-1)}$$

Therefore in the ball  $\left( v'(a) - \frac{1}{2n(n-1)}, v'(a) + \frac{1}{2n(n-1)} \right)$  there is at most

one number of the form  $\frac{p}{q}$  with  $q \leq n$ ! Moreover we know

there exists one such number - which is the value  $v(a)$ .

How do we find it?  $a' = v'(a) - \frac{1}{2n(n-1)}$   $b' = v'(a) + \frac{1}{2n(n-1)}$

If there is an integer between  $a'$  and  $b'$ , then we are done.

Otherwise check if there is some  $\frac{p}{q}$  with  $q=2$ . Multiply  $a'$ ,  $b'$  by 2.

Summary so far:

1. Proof of positional determinacy of finite as well as infinite version for the game starting at  $a_0$ . ~~positional strategy for infinite~~ [proof that was discussed can be applied to both versions. same strategy works for both cases].
2. Computing values uniformly for all vertices using a value iteration method. - Uri-Zwick's procedure.

Complexity:  $4n^3W \cdot |E|$

$$= O(|V|^3 \cdot W \cdot |E|)$$

→ pseudopolynomial.

Weights can be represented in binary. So all weights need  $\log W$  bits.

An algo with  $W$  steps will then be exponential in representation.

→ Same as PRIMES. If number is  $\#$  represented in unary (no. of bits same as the number) then simple algos work in PTIME. Main question was what happens when we have a binary representation.

Coming next: The above ~~comp~~ value iteration method computes

values. But it does not give a positional strategy immediately.

How to compute uniform positional strategies?

→ Theorem 3.1 in Zwick-Patterson's paper.